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property when he is embarrassed or insolvent; (6) failure of parties
to testify If the creditor can show any of the above then he has shifted
upon the defendants a burden of explanation.35
In conclusion, the rights of a subsequent creditor to set aside a
conveyance in Kentucky may be set out as follows: (1) The fact that
a conveyance is voluntary under K.R.S. 878.020- that is, the gift-by-
debtors law -affords him no protection at all; he must still show
actual fraudulent intent, directed toward his class, subsequent creditors.
His problem is mainly one of proof; (2) If a conveyance is attacked
by a future creditor under K.R.S. 878.010, on the ground that it was
made to "hmder, delay and defraud creditors", he may sometimes win
hs case by showing actual fraud directed toward present creditors.
But, if he is unable to do this, his problem again becomes one of prov-
ing actual fraudulent intent directed against his particular class of
creditors. In such case the right of these future creditors, in Kentucky
as elsewhere, depends upon the salient facts of the individual case.30
If these facts show an intent to defraud such creditors, protection is in
order. If not, there can be no protection. In the final analysis, the en-
tire problem involves a weighing of the debtor s interest in the free
use and disposal of his property as opposed to the future creditors in-
terest in protecting his claim.
CEciL D. WALDEN
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AS APPLIED TO MILITARY
PERSONNEL
The Supreme Court of the United States has decided in a recent
case' which included two other actions2 that servicemen cannot re-
cover under the Federal Tort Claims Act,3 for injuries which arise out
of or are in the course of activity incident to military service. This
' Campbell v. First National Bank of Barbourville, 234 Ky. 697, 701, 27 S.W
2d 975, 977 (1930).
' Peyton v. Webb, 29 Ky. L. R. 1151, 1153, 96 S.W 839, 840 (1906) where
the court said that each creditor who attacks a conveyance has the burden of show-
ing "by facts or circumstances that the conveyance was made with a fraudulent
intent before the property can be subjected. It is the intent and purpose with
which the debtor acts that renders the conveyance fraudulent, and this must be
determined by the facts of each particular case."
'Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S. Ct. 153 (1950).
Jefferson v. United States, 178 F 2d 518 (C.C.A. 4th 1949); United States
v. Griggs, 178 F 2d 1 (C.C.A. 10th 1949).
360 Stat. 842 (1946), 28 U. S. C. sees. 921-46 (1946). Now contained in
the newly revised Judicial Code in sees. 1291, 1346 (b), 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401,
2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680 (1948).
NoTFms AND COmNTS
decision is predicated upon the theory that since service men receive
certain benefits incident to their military service from the government,
Congress did not intend the Federal Tort Claims Act as an additional
benefit for them.
In the case of Feres v United States,4 Rudolph J. Feres, an army
lieutenant, while on active duty in the service of the United States was
burned to death in a barracks on a military post of the United States
in which he had been quartered by superior officers. His death was
alleged to have been the result of negligence on the part of said of-
ficers who required the deceased to be quartered in barracks which
were unsafe due to a defective heating plant, and further negligence
on the part of the fire guard and the fire guard's supervisors assigned
to that area. The Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit upheld the
trial court's order dismissing the action on the ground that it was im-
plied in the decision of Brooks v United States5 that there could be no
recovery where the injury or death was incident to service.
In Jefferson v United States,6 the plaintiff sought to recover for per-
sonal injuries resulting from a surgical operation performed by an
Army surgeon at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. At the time of the operation,
the plaintiff was an enlisted man on active duty He had undergone
this operation as a result of gall bladder trouble and the operation
was performed by the chief surgeon, a United States Army Medical
Officer. Later, on March 13, 1946, after plaintiff's discharge, when he
was again operated on at the Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, a
towel was found in the lower part of the plaintiff's stomach partly
worked into the duodenum. It bore the legend "Medical Department,
U. S. Army" and was 2/ feet long by 1 feet wide. The complaint
was dismissed although the court declared there was negligence on
the part of the agents or employees of the government at the hospital.
On appeal to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals,7 in affirming
the dismissal, the court concluded that the Federal Tort Claims Act
did not apply because it was unreasonable to assume that Congress,
in passing the Act to provide for the modification of governmental im-
munity, intended at the same time to subject every injury sustained
by a member of the armed forces in the execution of military orders
to the examination of a court of justice, if the injured person should
make a claim that his injury was caused by the negligence of a superior
officer.
'177 F 2d 535 (C. C. A. 2nd 1949).
' Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 69 S. Ct. 918, 93 L. Ed. 1200 (1949).
recovery where the injury or death was incident to service.
877 F Supp. 706 (D. C. D. M. 1948).
7178 F 2d 518 (C. C. A. 4th 1949).
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The third action" presented was that of an Army Officer on active
duty admitted under official orders to the Army Hospital at Scott Field
Air Base for the purpose of surgery and treatment. Death occurred
while under treatment and the widow, as executrix, sought to recover
damages for his wrongful death, allegedly caused by the negligent,
careless, and unskillful acts of members of the Army Medical Corps.
A judgment for the defendant was reversed by the Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit, which held that an action for his death might be main-
tamed against the United States.
The Federal Tort Claims Act 9 was enacted as Title IV of the Legis-
lative Reorganization Act of 1946. In effect it provides a sweeping pro-
vision for suits against the United States for injury or death "caused
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
government while acting within the scope of his office or employment
under circumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred."' 0
Twelve exceptions to liability under the Act are set forth, among
them, "Any claim ansing out of the combatant activities of the military
or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war,"" and "any
claim arising in a foreign country "12 No other specific exception was
made affecting military personnel.
The Supreme Court in affirmmg the Jefferson and Feres cases and
reversing the Griggs case pointed out that Brooks v United States, 3
in which they allowed recovery to two servicemen and upon which
appellants relied, was distinguishable in that the death and injuries
sustained by the Brooks brothers were not incident to their service in
the armed forces. 14 No circumstance existed to take the Brooks
brothers out of the scope of the Act. They were not engaged in combat
nor were they in a foreign country at the time of their injury, there-
fore, it was difficult to distinguish their status from that of their father
who also secured a personal injury judgment against the government
which did not appeal.15 In fact, the court in the Brooks case felt that
Welker Brooks technical status as a soldier should not operate to deny
hun a right like that given his father as a private citizen to recover
damages for the same act of negligence on the part of the United States.
8 Gnggs v. United States, 178 F 2d 1 (C. C. A. 10th 1949).
'Supra, note 3.
1028 U. S. C. sec. 1346(b) (1948).
" 28 U. S. C. sec. 2680(j) (1948).
"Supra note 12 subsec. (k).
"337 U.S. 49, 69 S. Ct. 918 (1949).
1337 U.S. 49, 52, 69 S. Ct. 918, 920 (1949).
"Note, 35 CORN. L. QuAiRT. 233, 234 (1949).
Noms ANiD Conmrris
The question that now arises is whether or not this act applies to
servicemen who are on active duty (and not on furlough) with the
armed forces m the United States, though not in time of war. Further-
more, is there any distinction between injuries which are service con-
nected m the sense of arising directly out of performance of military
duties and those injuries that are less directly a result of military
duties and attributable more to military status? The Supreme Court
of the United States concluded m the Feres case "that the Government
is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to service-
men where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity in-
cident to service."16 The court distinguished this case as being wholly
different from the Brooks case in that "the common fact underlying
the three cases is that each claimant while on active duty and not on
furlough sustained injury due to negligence of others in the armed
forces."'17 The claims were upheld in the Brooks case as they were
stated to be within the scope of the act because the injuries were not
incident to military service.18 This seems to indicate that the test as
to liability of the government is active duty status and the serviceman s
recovery does not depend upon his being "on duty" instead of "off
duty" at the time of injury Further, the fact that the injury was not
received in the scope of military employment would have no bearing
upon the serviceman s right to recover.
The Supreme Court states that precedents have denied any lia-
bility in tis kind of case and that it cannot impute to Congress such a
radical departure from established law in the absence of express con-
gressional command. It found no command in the general provision
for making the United States liable as an individual. In the first place
the command could be found in the general provision making the
United States liable as an individual. The court's argument that in-
dividuals don't have soldiers is frivolous. In the second place, the Act
classifies military personnel as government employees for purposes
of imposing liability on the United States for their negligence. 19 Why
should it not allow such persons to be claimants under the Act?
The court, however, does not have to rely on mere imputations of
congressional intent. Legislative history shows that when the Act was
first introduced to Congress it provided that claims "arising out of the
" Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 136, 71 S. Ct. 153, 155 (1950).
"' Supra note 5. In this case Arthur and Welker Brooks were at home on fur-
lough. While niding mn the family automobile with their father, near Fayetteville,
North Carolina, an Army truck driven by a civilian who was transporting an Army
band, struck their car, killing Arthur and severely injuring the other two members
of the family.
"Accord, Samson v. United States, 79 F Supp. 406 (S. D. N. Y. 1947).
"~28 U. S. C. sec. 941(b) (1946).
KETucyY LAw Joui NAL
activities of the military or naval forces or of the Coast Guard during
time of war" and arising in foreign countries were excluded. By way
of an amendment 2 offered by Mr. Monroney during a debate in the
House, the word "combatant" was inserted before the word "activities."
No explanation was given and this amendment was accepted without
further debate. Therefore, it seems that if it were not the intention of
Congress to include such torts, the amendment would undoubtedly
have been defeated and thereby excluding from coverage all "activi-
ties" instead of only "combatant activities." Furthermore, of the eigh-
teen tort claims bills introduced in Congress between 1925 and 1935,
all but two contained exceptions excluding relief to members of the
armed forces. When the present Act was introduced, the exceptions
had been dropped.2 1 A thirteenth exception 22 was included along with
the other twelve exceptions when the bill was originally introduced
in Congress, but was rejected. The World War Veterans Act 23 pro-
vides disability benefits to "any person who served in the active mil-
itary or naval service and who is disabled as a result of disease or in-
jury or aggravation of a preeusting disease or injury incurred in line
of duty in such service." This rejection then, of the thirteenth ex-
ception, would evidence a congressional intention to include injuries
received in line of duty under the Tort Claims Act.24
Perhaps the Supreme Court is fearful that if servicemen are al-
lowed to sue and obtain a judgment under the Federal Tort Claims
Act they would receive an additional or excessive recovery inasmuch
as they are entitled to certain benefits from the United States such as
disability pay, pensions, and other related veterans compensation.
Although this may be true, it should also be considered that govern-
ment pensions and other compensation do not include pain and suf-
fering as a measure of the amount awarded, while this is usually an
element of damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act.25 The service-
man should have full recovery less any benefits received. It would be
simple for the court to allow an election of remedies or for the judg-
ment obtained under the Federal Tort Claims Act to be reduced by
having all benefits previously received for the injury or death to be
'92 Cong. Rec. 10143 (1946).
t Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51, 69 S. Ct. 918, 920 (1949).
'"Any claim for which compensation is provided by the World War
Veterans Act of 1924, as amended."
' 88 U. S. C. A. see. 701(a) (1949).
'Note, 11 LA. L. REv. 125, 129 (1950). Yet, Congress appears to enact
specific exceptions when the occasion so demands. Under the Federal Employees'
Compensation Act, 5 U. S. C. A. sec. 751 et seq., federal employees are expressly
forbidden to sue the United States for injunes received m the course of their duties.
Lewis v. United States, 190 F 2d 22 (C.C.A. D.C. 1950).
' Note, 1 SYRAcusE L. REv. 87, 89, esp. n. 14 (1949).
NoTEs AN Com'nwm-rs
applied m mitigation of damages.26 Under the Federal Employees
Compensation Act 27 the civilian employee has an election of remedies
against a third party, but as to a veteran s claim, the Veterans Act28
has no such provision concerning an election of remedy The rule
followed m the Brooks case is that the amount of any judgment will be
reduced by the benefits paid or payable to the serviceman or his bene-
ficiaries.2 9
Another objection raised against allowing the serviceman to re-
cover was that to do so would open the door to a flood of litigation
and that every time a member of the armed forces was injured for any
reason whatsoever, a suit against the government would possibly fol-
low and as a result it would seriously affect military discipline and
morale.30 This objection is only remotely possible because the Tort
Claims Act specifically prohibits all claims arising from servicemen
during time of war in actual combat3i and any claim arising in a for-
eign country 32 Also the Act provides that all claims for less than
$1,000 may be handled by a federal admimstrative agency," It is very
likely, therefore, that most claims would be in this latter category since
an injured serviceman usually incurs no medical expenses nor suffers
any loss of wages, whereas the elements of damages which the Tort
Claims Act cover, such as pain and suffering are excluded from the
government pensions and other benefits received by the serviceman.
The English Government, in enacting the Crown Proceedings Act
of 1947 34 has in effect attained the equivalent of the Federal Tort
Claims Act. The English counterpart contains express provisions re-
garding claims by one member of the armed forces of the Crown
against another. The Crown is not liable for the death or personal in-
jury suffered by a member of the armed forces at the hands of an-
other member of those forces in substance:
(a) when the former is on duty and is either killed or injured by the
act of another member of the forces while on duty- or
(b) when, although not actually on duty, the former is killed or in-
In White v. United States, 77 F Supp. 316 (D.C. N.J. 1948), it was held
that civilian employees who received benefits under the Federal Employees Com-
pensation Act were not barred from suing the government under the Federal Tort
Claims Act for the same injury, although compensation awards would be applied
in mitigation of damages m their tort judgments. See also United States v. Wade,
170 F 2d 298 (C.C.A. 1st 1948); Contra: Jordan v. United States, 170 F 2d 211(C.C.A., 5th 1948).
^39 STAT. 742 (1916), 5 U.S.C. sec. 757 (1946).
- 43 STAT. 607 (1924), 38 U.S.C. sec. 421 et seq. (1946).
"Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53, 69 S. Ct. 918, 921 (1949).
United States v. Brooks, 169 F 2d 840, 845 (C.C.A. 4th 1948).
ii28 U.S.C. see. 943(j) (1946).
Supra note 31 (k) (1946).
'28 U.S.C. see. 921(a) (1946).
10 & 11 Geo. VI, c. 44, sec. 10 (1947).
KENTUCKY- LAW JOURNAL
jured by the act of a fellow member of the forces if the event
causing the death or injury happens on military premises, or on
a ship, aircraft, or vehicle used for military purposes.'
It is further provided that the Minister of Pensions must certify that an
award be made to the injured person.3 7 It must be noted that exemp-
tion from liability under this section relates only to death or personal
injuries; it does not extend to libel or false imprisonment.38 The Eng-
lish have arrived at a reasonable solution to the problem by waiving
the immunity of the sovereign yet barring military personnel from
suing their government for death or personal injuries caused by fel-
low servicemen when the injured man was on duty, or when the injury
or death occurred on military premises, or on a ship, aircraft or vehicle
used for military purposes; and only after the Minister of Pensions
certifies that an award will be made to the injured person. In com-
parison with the three cases at bar decided by the Supreme Court it is
probable that under the Crown Procedings Act of 1947 all three com-
plainants would be precluded from recovery because the servicemen
killed or injured happened to be on military premises at the time, but
the exemptions of the English Act are more narrow and certainly more
definite.
In conclusion it appears that the court in rejecting the plain lan-
guage of the Act has been influenced by what it considers to be sound
policy Yet, is it for the court to disregard the intention of Congress
in view of the presumption that Congress was aware that the broad
scope of the act extended to claims of military personnel? It is not
plausible to contend that Congress intended to relegate the soldier to
an inferior and less privileged status as a tort claimant. The court's
distinction between injuries incident and not incident to service is in
effect that a soldier on active duty will be denied recovery while one
on furlough or absent without leave will be allowed to recover for the
same injury The act was drafted with skill and circumspection and
at a time when Congress would hardly be said to have been unaware
of the rights of servicemen. Thus, one can only agree with the dis-
senting judge of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the Brooks case that
"the language of the act, being clear as it is, the matter is one for Con-
gress and not for the courts."39
JAMEs F HOGE
However, no decisions have been found which indicate the English meaning
of "on duty" It is suggested by the wording of the English provision that their
interpretation of a member of the armed forces on duty would be more narrow




United States v. Brooks, 169 F 2d 840, 850 (C.C.A. 4th 1948).
